This paper investigates the extent to which companies headquartered in Scotland were exposed to heightened political uncertainty in the run-up to, and after, the 2014 independence referendum. Using a specially constructed capitalisation weighted stock price index for Scottish companies listed on the London stock exchange, evidence is presented to show that in the early part of the sample period, from April 2010 to late 2013, the conditional volatilities of the Scottish stock returns and of returns in the FTSE all share index can be characterised by the same GARCH parameters, but this is no longer the case once the estimation period is extended closer to the referendum date. Further investigation indicates that the relative volatility of Scottish companies' stock returns peaked in early September 2014, when the polls suggested the referendum result was too close to call, fell back after the referendum result was known, but built up again in the run up to the publication of the Smith Commission's report on further devolution in November 2014. These key findings are found to be robust to the inclusion/exclusion of the Royal Bank of Scotland, the whole of the Scottish financial sector, and companies operating in the oil and gas sector from the Scottish stock price index.
Introduction
An interesting feature of referendums is that they are often motivated by the desire to resolve big debates, or to settle issues characterised by strong and divergent views, once and for all. Unlike countries such as Switzerland where referendums have been commonplace, in the UK they had been much less frequent. But two big referendum campaigns -the Scottish independence referendum in 2014 and the EU referendum in 2016 -have had highly significant implications for the UK economy.
One consequence of referendums can be a rise in uncertainty. This is especially likely when the economic and political stakes are high, as was the case during both the Scottish independence and EU referendums. The effects are also likely to be strongest when the outcome is uncertain, as again was the case in the run up to the Scottish independence and EU referendums (in both cases, opinion polls shortly before the vote put both sides within sight of victory). In a world of 24 hour news coverage, it is also much more likely that every scrap of information, both credible and more speculative, is shared across a wider number of people. This too can lead to heightened uncertainty. This paper examines information from financial markets in the run up to, and immediately after, the 2014 Scottish independence referendum. To the best of our knowledge it is the first study to focus on stock market volatility around the time of the Scottish independence referendum. More specifically, we construct a capitalisation weighted daily stock price index for Scottish companies listed on the London stock exchange, and model stock returns for this index as compared to returns for the FTSE all share index. We are able to show that for the early part of our sample period, from April 2010 to late 2013, the conditional volatilities of the Scottish stock returns and of returns in the FTSE all share index can be characterised by the same GARCH parameters, but that this is no longer the case once estimation extends beyond mid December 2013. Upon further investigation we show that that the relative stock market volatility of Scottish companies' stock returns peaked in early September 2014, at a time when the polls suggested the referendum result was too close to call, fell back after the referendum result was known, but built up again in the run up to the publication of the Smith Commission's report on further devolution in November 2014. We demonstrate that these findings are robust to the inclusion/exclusion of the Royal Bank of Scotland; to the exclusion of the whole of the Scottish financial sector; and to the exclusion of Scottish listed companies operating in the oil and gas sector.
Note that this analysis does not constitute an attempt to assess whether or not Scottish independence would be good or bad for the economy. Instead it is designed to investigate the impact of the referendum itself on financial market volatility, to see whether or not the referendum added significantly and differentially to the volatility of stock returns of Scottish companies as compared to the FTSE as a whole; and to determine whether any differential impact diminished rapidly once the referendum result was revealed.
Stock market volatility matters in part because it is likely to discourage new share issues and initial public offerings. The performance of companies' shares also impacts on lenders' risk assessments, meaning that higher volatility can result in an increase in the companies' costs of borrowing. Recent research, see for example Bloom, Baker and Davis (2013) , has suggested that the kind of political uncertainty associated with elections and referendums can increase unemployment and reduce investment, but this will matter less if any period of heightened volatility is short lived.
It is interesting to note that since the 2014 referendum, the Scottish economy has grown much more slowly than the UK as a whole. Over the two years to the end of 2016 for example, the UK economy grew by 3.6% while the Scottish economy grew by just 1.2%. A number of prominent business leaders and politicians have expressed fears that the uncertainties caused by 2014 referendum -and a possible future re-run -could, in part, be a reason for this much weaker performance.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2 briefly discusses some key findings in related literature, which help to motivate our work; section 3 sets out a timeline of key events in the run up to, and in the aftermath of, the 2014 Scottish independence referendum. In section 4 we explain how the publicly listed companies headquartered in Scotland were identified and describe the data used in this study.
Section 5 outlines the econometric methodology employed. Section 6 presents the key results. A number of robustness checks are carried out in section 7 and section 8 concludes.
Related literature
There are very few empirical studies of the impact of referendums on stock market volatility. Nonetheless a number of studies have examined the behaviour of stock market volatility around the time of elections: these include Goodell and Vähämaa (2013) and Li and Born (2006) who focused on US presidential elections; Smales (2014) who looked at Australian elections; and Bialkowski, Gottschalk and Wisniewski (2008) who looked at evidence for 27 OECD countries around the time of national elections. Each of these studies concluded that elections are accompanied by a significant hike in stock market volatility, and demonstrated that this heightened volatility is more pronounced in closely contested races when polling suggests that no candidate has a dominant lead. They also point to a number of cases in which the excessive volatility could not be resolved quickly, for example when the political orientation of the government changes or when the election result was inconclusive.
These empirical results are consistent with the theoretical predictions of Veronesi (2012, 2014) .
Other aspects of political uncertainty have been studied by Siokis and Kapopoulos (2007) who provided evidence that political regime changes impacted on the conditional variance of the Athens stock market indices. Alongside the multicountry results presented by Bialkowski et al. (op. cit.) , Vuchelen (2003) emphasised that election results tend to contain much less information about future policies in coalition-based political systems. Whilst election results may have some impact in reducing uncertainties by eliminating some possibilities, more decisive positions only become clear once a new coalition has been announced. Using Belgian data he demonstrated that election outcomes are considered by investors with a time lag while the formation of a new coalition that tends to have the more significant impact on the stock prices at the Brussels Stock Exchange. This kind of timing issue may be relevant after the Scottish referendum result too, particularly given that neither a 'yes' or 'no' vote was going to result in prolonging the status quo. As is explained in section 3, a commitment had been given prior to the vote by the then leaders of the three main UK parties campaigning against Scottish independence, that further powers would be devolved to the Scottish Parliament should voters opt to remain within the UK. Arin, Molchanov and Reich (2013) examined the effects of a number of political variables on stock returns and their volatilities using Bayesian methods applied to a panel dataset for 17 parliamentary democracies spanning the post-war period until 1995.
They argued against focusing only on election years and found the empirical case for effects of political variables on stock return volatilities was considerably stronger than the case for effects of these variables on stock returns.
Far fewer studies that have explored how political uncertainty influences financial markets outside of the election cycle. An exception, with some similarities to our own, is Beaulieu, Cosset and Essadam (2006) . This paper focuses on the Quebec referendum in October 1995 which could have led to the separation of Quebec from the Canadian federation. As in the Scottish case, opinion polls did not agree on a clear winning side, so uncertainty associated with the Quebec referendum could not be resolved prior to the vote. Even after the result, when 50.6% voted No, it was not clear that this had immediately resolved uncertainty with respect to Quebec's future.
The impact of the resolution of uncertainty has been investigated in several papers that look at the behaviour of asset price volatility around the time of scheduled information releases. The clear consensus of these empirical studies is that volatility in financial markets tends to: i) be significantly greater on announcement days than on other days; ii) remain significantly higher for several hours after the information release; and iii) dissipates rapidly as uncertainty is resolved; see for example, Smales (2013), Äijö (2011), Chen and Clements (2007) , Nikkinen and Sahlström (2004) , and Donders and Vorst (1996) and Lee (1996, 1993) .
The Beaulieu et al. (op. cit.) paper on the impact of the Quebec referendum provides a particularly helpful starting point for our own work. In particular, they sought to contrast the impact of the uncertainty surrounding the referendum outcome on the stock returns of 71 Quebec firms as compared to a sample of Canadian (apart from Quebec) and U.S. firms. Their choice of Quebec firms was based upon those headquartered in the province of Quebec and listed on the Montreal Stock Exchange and/or on the Toronto Stock Exchange at the time of the referendum. They found that the uncertainty surrounding the referendum outcome had a significant, but ultimately short-term impact on the stock returns of Quebec firms. Furthermore, the reaction of financial markets to the referendum outcome was indicative of a resolution of uncertainty, which they found to be particularly important for domestic Quebec firms.
The Scottish Independence Referendum Timeline
The Scottish independence referendum took place on 18 th September 2014. The timeline of events set out above has informed the choice of sample period in this study. In order to capture key events in the run-up to the referendum date, the estimation period starts in April 2010. In order to examine whether any financial market impacts of uncertainty surrounding the referendum result were resolved after the results were announced, the post referendum sample extends to June 2015. We avoid extending the sample beyond this, e.g. to include the run up to the Brexit referendum, since we want to focus on the period in which Scotland could reasonably be seen to be experiencing uncertainty in a way that is distinctive to that facing the UK as a whole.
Data
The first step toward constructing a Scottish stock price index is to identify companies listed on the LSE that can be classified as 'Scottish' during the period under study. The key criteria applied are that selected companies had their headquarters in Scotland and/or that their major operations were located within Scotland, during part or all of the sample period investigated. A similar strategy is discussed in Marsh and Evans (2014) case, in our view it is important to note that uncertainty around independence wasn't just about how well Scotland would perform economically, it was also about fundamental legal and constitutional structures, economic rules and regulations, membership of the EU and applicability of global treaties etc. Many of these factors would have a distinctive impact on companies headquartered in Scotland, not just how exposed they were to our market share. So, for example, two financial services companies with equal market share in Scotland faced a completely different set of risks if one was registered in London and the other in Edinburgh.
Several sources of relevant information were consulted to inform this approach. companies using capitalisation and other data as close to the date of the referendum as possible. We were keen to avoid the short-cut of fixing capitalisation weights throughout the sample period. Even a look at the variation in the market capitalisation of the top 10 Scottish listed companies at some key dates suggests this would be unwise, see Table 2 below. We therefore collected daily data on both market capitalisation and stock prices for each Scottish listed company from Datastream, and chose to construct a capitalisation weighted stock price index in which the capitalisation weights are updated each period, mimicking the construction of the FTSE indices as closely as possible. The presence of the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) in our sample raises some 'interesting' issues. As is well known, RBS received a substantial bail-out during the depths of the financial crisis. Throughout our sample period the UK Government held 81% of the company's shares. Given the peculiarities of this special case, our core sample excludes RBS shares from the construction of the Scottish share price index, nonetheless, at various points we also show results that do include RBS in the index.
More generally the finance sector makes up a large, and growing, part of the Scottish stock price index than the FTSE over the sample period considered here.
Another sector that has historically had strong representation among Scotland's listed companies is the oil and gas sector. This sector has also been subjected to particular challenges over the period we investigate -with the oil price falling from around $100
per barrel in 2014 to half that by the end of 2015. These considerations have motivated us to construct of a number of additional indicies which are used in several robustness checks discussed in Section 6. For now we simply summarise market capitalisation by sector over each full calendar year from 2010 to 2015 in Table 3 . Daily data were also collected for the FTSE all share index, which is used as a benchmark series to compare and contrast with the volatility of the Scottish indices.
Focusing on comparing the volatility of stock returns based on alternative capitalisation weighted stock price indices with that of the FTSE all share index avoids us having to match each individual Scottish listed company with a 'similar' company located elsewhere in the UK. In our view, attempting this kind of matching would be both nontrivial and, in many cases, controversial. The FTSE all share index is chosen over the FTSE100 or FTSE250 since there are relatively few of the Scottish companies represented in these alternative indices. We discuss the suitability our choice of the FTSE all share index as the benchmark index further in Section 6.
Summary statistics for the key series investigated over the full sample, i.e. all trading days from 6th April 2010 to 4th June 2015, are provided in Table 4 . i.e. extreme positive and negative values of returns occur more frequently in the data than would be consistent with the normal distribution. The final three tests reported in Table 4 provide evidence of significant autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity in each series, which is supportive of the need for the GARCH modelling strategy adopted in this paper.
Econometric Methodology
Our key objective is to examine the extent to which listed companies headquartered in Scotland were exposed to heightened political uncertainty in the run-up to, and after, the 2014 independence referendum. To achieve this objective, having constructed the stock price indicies described in the previous section, and after calculating daily returns, i.e. Specifically, having demonstrated that the stock returns series exhibit significant volatility clustering on the basis of the ARCH effects identified in The model also incorporates mean equations for the two stock return series. We shall investigate whether lags of each of the returns series play any significant role in the two mean equations, either individually or jointly. Our expectation is that they will not, in line with the common finding that stock returns are unpredictable, while we expect to be able to capture systematic elements of conditional volatility in the equations set out above.
Under the assumption of conditional normality the system of equations that characterise the DVECH GARCH(1,1) model can be estimated by maximum likelihood. = β β . If this null hypothesis is data admissible, at least over some part of the sample period that we examine, this provides some justification for using the FTSE all share index as a reasonable benchmark against which to compare volatilities Scottish companies' stock returns. In the results presented in Section 6 we first look at the full sample period and find that the null hypothesis is rejected, but then find that if estimation is ended in October 2012, at the point that the Edinburgh Agreement was signed, this null hypothesis of equality of the GARCH parameters cannot be rejected. Then by successively rolling forward the end date of the sample used in estimation we are able to investigate at what point in time there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the parameterisation of the volatility of Scottish stock returns differs from that of returns on the FTSE all share index. Nonetheless, results from this kind of sequential testing should be seen as relatively informal, and indicative, since tests of this kind are not statistically independent, with the consequence that the true size of the tests is likely to be distorted.
One disadvantage of bivariate GARCH modelling is the imposition of symmetry in the effects of positive and negative shocks. We therefore move on to separate univariate modelling of the conditional volatility of the two stock returns series, exploiting the greater flexibility this allows. Both exponential (EGARCH) and threshold (TGARCH) models, proposed by Nelson (1991) and Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (1993) respectively, are shown to be more appropriate than the simple GARCH model for our data. Again this is not unexpected. Both these specifications allow for asymmetric effects of shocks on volatility, in the sense that 'bad news' in the form of a drop in the share price index tends to be followed by higher volatility than 'good news'
i.e. a rise in the index of the same magnitude. The precise specifications of the conditional volatility equations in each of these cases is are shown below: 
Another issue to be confronted in the univariate modelling is the choice of distribution assumed in estimation. This choice is fundamental to obtaining efficient parameter estimates and to admitting the extreme errors that financial markets sometimes produce. The initial examination of our data, as summarised in Following estimation under the assumption of the Student's t distribution the estimation of an additional parameter provides information about the thickness of the tails of the distribution. The Student's t distribution approaches normal when this parameter is greater than 30, while a significantly lower parameter indicates thicker tails. Estimation of the models under the assumption that the error variance follows a standardised GED adds estimation of a shape parameter that controls the fatness of the tails. When this shape parameter is 2 the tails are well represented by the normal distribution. A shape parameter that is significantly larger or smaller than 2 is indicative of fatter tails.
After estimating GARCH, EGARCH and TGARCH models under each of the available distributional assumptions, a preferred specification can be chosen in line with standard practice on the basis of: i) the significance of the estimated parameters;
ii) the diagnostic tests based upon the properties of the standardised residuals; and iii) minimising the relevant information criterion.
Having chosen the preferred specifications for each of the key returns series, the time series for the estimated conditional variances from the separately estimated univariate models are examined. At this point we can seek evidence of any widening divergence in the conditional volatility of stock returns of the Scottish companies relative to that of the UK benchmark series. By identifying the time periods in which any major divergences occur and checking to see if these periods are associated with the timing of key events associated with the timeline of the independence referendum as set out in section 2, then by checking whether any divergence persists or is resolved as further time passes, we are able to explore the whether there is evidence of clear financial market impact of the political uncertainty generated by the independence referendum.
Results

Bivariate GARCH results
The first set of results, shown in column 1 of Table 5 , are the DVECH GARCH estimates that jointly model the mean, variances and covariance of the Scottish stock returns, excluding RBS, and returns in the FTSE all share index over the full sample period. The mean equations in each case involve an intercept term and the first lags of each of the returns series in each equation, so stock returns are modelled using a VAR of order 1. Whilst the lagged terms in the mean equations do not appear to be significant individually they are jointly significant as indicated in the first of the likelihood ratio tests provided in the table; on this basis they are retained (although it is worth pointing out the same inference with respect to the other parameters of the model holds, whether the mean equations contain a lag of each returns series or just an intercept term). The second likelihood ratio test reported in each column indicates that the null hypothesis of constant variances and covariance is strongly rejected in every case, so supports modelling the time varying conditional variances and covariances. (2) and (4).
Columns (1) and (2) report the unrestricted and restricted estimates of the model using the full sample period, where the restricted model constrains the ARCH and GARCH parameters to be the same for both series. The null hypothesis that the two returns series are characterised by the same ARCH and GARCH parameters is strongly rejected over the full sample, 6th April 2011 -4th June 2015, as indicated in the likelihood ratio test at the foot of column (2) of Table 5 , and its respective p-value of 0.02. However, this result is overturned if estimation is ended in October 2012, at the point that the Edinburgh Agreement, which agreed the legislation necessary for the independence referendum, was signed. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 show the unrestricted and restricted estimates of the model when the sample ends on 15th
October 2012. We are unable to reject the null hypothesis that the two returns series are characterised by the same GARCH process using this shorter estimation period, as indicated in the second likelihood ratio test shown at the foot of column (4). We appeal to this finding to justify our use of the FTSE all share index as a benchmark against which to compare the volatility of Scottish stock returns.
Our next step is to repeat the estimation of the unrestricted and restricted DVECH GARCH models and construct the equivalent likelihood ratio tests for a number of different sample periods. The objective is to investigate at what point in time there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the parameterisation of the volatility of Scottish stock returns begins to differ significantly from that of returns on the FTSE all share index. As explained in Section 5, the results obtained from this investigation should be seen only as indicative, since sequential tests of this kind are not statistically independent. The results presented in the top panel of Table 6 indicate that by the time of the publication of the 'Blueprint for Independence' in November 2014, the volatility of Scottish stock returns had already begun to deviate from that of the volatility of the FTSE all share index, the LR test indicates that the null hypothesis of equality of the GARCH parameters is rejected at the 10% level of significance. The rejection of the null is stronger, at the 1% level of significance when estimation extends through to the publication of the Scottish Independence Bill in July 2014. The lower panel of Table 6 repeats the same testing but this time stopping the estimation period to 18 months before the referendum date, then extending the end date at monthly intervals through to 1 month before the vote (the end date is chosen to be the 18th of each month, or the last trading day prior to this date). While inference cannot be entirely precise, it is notable that the null hypothesis that the same GARCH parameters can adequately describe the volatility of returns on the FTSE all share index and the volatility of Scottish returns is rejected at the 10% level of significance, or less, for estimation periods that end on 18th June 2013 onwards, that is 15 months prior to the date of the referendum, onwards; and the relevant probability values are strictly decreasing over the last 5 months prior to the referendum.
Univariate GARCH, EGARCH and TGARCH models
As explained in Section 5, there are some disadvantages of multivariate GARCH models. In practice, univariate models can be more flexible and are likely to be better able to capture some aspects of the data. Tables 7a, 7b Notes: see Table 7a . Notes: see Table 7a .
Columns (1) to (3) (4) to (6) report estimates of the EGARCH model and columns (7) to (9) report the TGARCH estimates, again under each of the three distributional assumptions.
Throughout these univariate results the mean equations consist only of an intercept term. The addition of the first lag of the stock returns was statistically insignificant in every case -this is consistent with the usual result that the level of stock returns is not predictable from its own past history. In columns (2), (5) and (9), the result reported in the 'Distribution' row in the diagnostic tests section of the table and provides information relating to the thickness of the tails of the distribution. The significance of this parameter indicates fatter tails than the normal distribution would predict. In columns (3), (6) and (9) the shape parameter from the GED estimates is reported is recorded in the 'Distribution' row of the diagnostic tests section of the table.
The fact that this parameter is always significantly below 2 across all the GED estimates is also indicative of fat tails. Provided that the GARCH models are correctly specified, all three estimators are consistent, but given the presence of fat tails, we expect the estimates that assume the Student's t-distribution or alternatively the GED should work better and be more efficient. In practice, and as expected, the estimates of each of the parameters are very similar for a given GARCH, EGARCH or TGARCH specification, but the standard errors are typically lower for the estimates that assume a Student's t-distribution or the GED than the robust standard errors obtained for the quasi maximum likelihood estimates.
In every case, the key estimated parameters in the conditional volatility equations {α, β, γ} are always significantly different from zero, as indicated in the very low p-values recorded in the tables. This suggests that the systematic behaviour of the conditional volatility of stock returns is captured well by the models; only the intercept term in the conditional volatility equations, ϖ , often fails to reach significance. The diagnostic tests, conducted using the standardised residuals, indicate that the null hypothesis of normally distributed disturbances is always rejected, echoing the message that the robust standard errors and/or the assumption of non-normal error distributions is appropriate. In most cases the standardised residuals exhibit both skewness and excess kurtosis, the only exceptions are the GARCH and EGARCH models of Scottish stock returns (columns (1) to (6) of Table 7b ), for which no significance skewness is detected.
The report ARCH tests convey a more positive message, indicating that the modelling of conditional volatility is sufficient to fail to reject the null hypothesis of no remaining autoregressive heteroskedasicity of order 1, up to order 5 or up to order 10 in the (squared) standardised residuals.
The significance of the asymmetric terms in the EGARCH and TGARCH models implies that either of these specifications is preferable to the pure GARCH model and the parameter estimates are consistent with the interpretation that negative shocks have a greater impact on conditional volatility than positive shocks of the same magnitude. Further discrimination between the models is feasible through use of the information criteria. The AIC and SBIC are both minimised when the GED estimates of the TGARCH model is chosen, in column (9) of Table 7a for the FTSE returns. This achieves a marginal improvement on the EGARCH estimates that assume the tdistribution shown in column (5); the quasi maximum likelihood estimates of the EGARCH model with robust standard errors achieve minimum AIC and SBIC in the case of the Scottish stock returns series, i.e. column (4) of Table 7b ; and in the case of the Scottish series excluding RBS in Table 7c , the EGARCH model estimates that assume the t-distibution in column (5).
Having chosen a set of preferred models, we now go on to examine the estimated conditional volatilities of stock returns for the FTSE all share index and the Scottish indices respectively. Figure 2a plots the estimated conditional volatilities derived from the preferred models reported in Tables 7a and 7b over the full sample period. Scot FTSE
Looking at the volatility of the series as a whole, we find that the two series tend to be highly correlated with each other. This is unsurprising. Most listed companies operate in global markets and are impacted by the same issues -e.g. swings in stock market sentiment in Wall Street. Similarly, given the close linkages between the Scottish and rUK economies, the economic outlook for the UK will be highly correlated with the economic outlook for Scotland. We also find however, that the Scottish series The above results are somewhat sensitive to the inclusion/exclusion of RBS. As mentioned previously, there are special factors to take into consideration. RBS shares prices have a big impact on the Scottish series firstly given its sheer scale (the share price series attracts large market capitalization weights). There are also well known factors that affect changes in the RBS share price at various points in our sample period, not least reflecting regular debates about whether the government would or would not begin to sell some of its 85% stake in the bank. For these reasons our preferred Scottish index, which can allow us to focus more clearly on the impacts of the independence referendum on Scottish stock market volatility, is the series that excludes RBS (and this was the series used exclusively in the bi-variate models reported in section 6.1). However, in common with earlier results reported in Table 6 , the conditional volatilities seem to diverge in the period running up to the referendum and beyond, 
Robustness Checks
In this section we check the robustness of the key findings set out above. As explained in section 4, the finance sector makes up a large, and growing, part of the capitalisation weighted Scottish stock price index over the sample period examined here. In order to examine whether our key results reflect volatility in this sector or are spread more widely across Scottish shares, we construct a Scottish index that excludes the share prices of all the Scottish listed companies operating in the finance sector.
In addition, we have previously noted that the oil and gas sector has historically had a strong presence among Scotland's listed companies and has also been subjected to particular challenges over the sample period. In order to check whether the volatility experienced in this sector is affecting the overall results we construct another index that excludes oil and gas companies from our main Scottish index. The effects of running the analysis on these indicies are summarised in Figure 4 .
Our final check is based on an index that removes the three largest Scottish listed companies by share capitalisation i.e. the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), Scottish and Southern Electricity (SSE) and Standard Life. As indicated in Table 2 , at the time of the independence referendum these three companies accounted for over 60% of total market capitalisation. Constructing a new index that excludes these companies allows us to check whether the key characteristics in the movements in estimated volatility identified above are dominated by movements in the share prices of the largest companies, or are spread more widely. Figure 5 presents a summary of the results. The exclusion of the SSE and Standard Life along with RBS clearly does have an impact on the results. The jump that followed the publication of the YouGov poll on 7 th September 2014 is now less evident, instead there was a steadier climb in relative volatility as the referendum date approached. Also, the post referendum decline in relative volatility it is not as pronounced and, aside from the October downward spike mentioned earlier, the relative volatility of the smaller Scottish listed companies is estimated to have reached a local peak on the publication of the Smith Commission report, with a lesser decline thereafter. Suffice to say that we have provided some tentative evidence that smaller listed Scottish companies may have been more severely impacted by heightened volatility around the time of the independence referendum than their larger counterparts. Further exploration of these differences is left for future work.
Conclusions
This paper has made a number of contributions to the existing literature. First, it has identified Scottish companies listed on the London Stock Exchange over a period that included the Scottish independence referendum and constructed a capitalisation weighted Scottish stock price index. Second, it has investigated the volatility of stock returns of Scottish companies listed on the London Stock Exchange as compared to the volatility of daily returns using the FTSE all share index around the time of the independence referendum. The estimated models were shown to provide a good description of time varying conditional volatility over the sample period. Third, through exploring how the volatility of stock returns evolves in the run up to and after the referendum, this paper contributes to the wider literature on the impacts of political uncertainty outside 'normal' election cycles.
Key findings are firstly that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the conditional volatility of FTSE and Scottish (ex. RBS) stock returns can be characterised by the same GARCH parameters up to a sample period ending in late 2013; and second, that as the referendum date approaches this result is overturned, with the strength of the rejection increasing for the last 5 months prior to the referendum. Together these results suggest that while the volatilities of Scottish and FTSE all share indicies have similar characteristics up to late 2013, there is evidence of significant divergence in the later part of the sample. A closer look reveals that in the run-up to the independence referendum, the relative volatility of Scottish stock returns increased, reaching a peak after 7th September when the polls suggested the referendum race was too close to call.
The volatility of Scottish stock returns then fell immediately after the referendum result but climbed again in the run up to the release of the Smith Commission report which provided information on proposed "extensive new powers" for the Scottish Parliament.
The reaction of financial markets at this time demonstrates that the referendum did not entirely resolve the uncertainty that both companies and investors faced with respect to future policy.
We have shown that these key results are robust to inclusion/exclusion of RBS;
of companies in the Oil & Gas sector; and of all companies in the Financial Services sector. We have also presented some tentative evidence that once the three Scottish companies with highest market capitalisation are excluded, the post referendum decline in stock market volatility is more muted, with the volatility of the remaining companies' stock returns reaching a (local) peak on at the time of the publication of the Smith Commission report. Further exploration of possible differential impacts of referendum related uncertainty on Scottish companies of different sizes is left for future research.
